BATCH 6 DOWNLOAD (except #s 1 & 2 cases)
Batch 4
Sabena Belgian Airlines vs. CA Facts: Mrs. Fule purchased three round trip tickets for herself and two children from Sabena; the route: Manila-Brussels-Barcelona-Madrid. During the trip, they encountered inconveniences, such as, walking under the drizzle after disembarking; delayed connecting flight to Barcelona; and a missing luggage, among others. They allegedly incurred medical and hotel expenses. Thus, Mrs. Fule made a letter-complaint to Sabena office. The Madrid Office offered to pay about half of what she was asking, that the rest would be paid by the Manila Office. A certain Yancha made her sign a document in French language which she did not understand. It turned out that the document was a quitclaim. The trial court awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages, among others. CA modified the decision by reducing the amount of moral and exemplary damages. Issue: WON Sabena is liable to the Fules for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage. Held: Yes. In the imposition of moral damages, the defendant’s act must be wrongful or wanton or done in bad faith. Here, there is no finding that the carrier’s delay in delivering Mrs. Fule’s luggage was wrongful or due to bad faith. While there is failure on the part of the carrier in protecting Mrs. Fule et al from the rain, its neglect was not so gross as to amount to bad faith or wantoness. What is involved in this case is simple negligence, considering that the rain through which Mrs. Fule et al had to walk was a slight drizzle. Nonetheless, there is still bad faith in making Mrs. Fule sign a quitclaim without informing her of its contents. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - “[W]ith respect to moral damages, the rule is that the same are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where (1) the mishap results in the death a of passenger and (2) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result.” (Ibid, at p. 13) As the appellate court found the petitioner guilty of bad faith in letting the respondent sign a quitclaim without her knowledge or understanding and contrary to what she was planning to do, the reduced award of moral and exemplary damages is proper and legal. Lopez vs Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) Facts: Senator Lopez et al made reservations for 1st class accommodations in a flight of Pan Am from Tokyo to San Francisco. The reservations were confirmed in a phone call. Tickets were also issued. However, Lopez et al were not accommodated in the first class for the reason that there was no accommodation for them. They instead took the tourist passengers without prejudice to any claim against Pan Am. Subsequently, a suit for damages was filed against Pan Am. Pan Am answered admitting its breach of the contract of carriage but however denied the allegation of bad faith. It contends that the failure to provide 1st class accommodations was made in honest mistake: That the accommodation was mistakenly cancelled, and expecting that there would be subsequent cancellation of bookings, they withheld the information regarding the cancellation from Lopez et al. Issue: WON Pan Am should be held liable for damages to Lopez et al. Held: Yes. The actuation of Pan Am may have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will. “Self-enrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal ill-will, may well have been the motive; but it is malice nevertheless.” There being a clear admission in defendant’s evidence of facts amounting to a bad faith on its part in regard to the breach of its contracts with plaintiffs, it becomes unnecessary to further discuss the evidence adduced by plaintiffs to establish defendant’s bad faith. Among others, Lopez et al can be awarded moral damages (where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith) and exemplary damages (where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner). Zulueta vs. Pan Am Facts: Mr. Zulueta and his wife and child boarded a flight of Pan Am from Wake Island to the Phil. Mr. Zulueta, however, had to relieve himself and thus looked for a secluded place in the beach. As a result, he was delayed in boarding for some 20 or 30 minutes. While Mr. Zulueta was reaching the ramp, the captain of the plane demonstrated an intemperate and arrogant tone thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back. Thus, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded. The airport manager of then sent Mr. Zulueta a letter stating that his stay in Wake Island would be for a minimum of one week during which he would be charged $13.30 per day. Issue: WON Pan Am should be held liable. Held: Yes. Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded to retaliate and punish him for the embarrassment and loss of face thus suffered by defendant’s agent. The Zuluetas had a contract of carriage with the defendant, as a common carrier, pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a substantial monetary consideration paid by the former, not merely to transport them to Manila, but, also, to do so with “extraordinary diligence” or “utmost diligence.” The responsibility of the common carrier, under said contract, as regards the passenger’s safety, is of such a nature, affecting as it does public interest, that it “cannot be dispensed with” or even “lessenedby stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.” In the present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible inconvenience. ——————————————————— With regard to DAMAGES It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the circumstances, defendant’s agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident bad faith. If “gross negligence” warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages PAL vs. Miano Facts: Miano took one of the flights of PAL (Mabuhay Class) bound to Germany. He allegedly checked in a brown suit case. Upon arrival in Germany, his luggage was missing. It was only after 11 days when he was bale to obtain such. Allegedly, he incurred expenses as a result of the delay. Thus, he wrote a demand letter to PAL. Having failed to recover, he instituted a claim for damages. The CFI rendered a decision ordering PAL to pay moral and exemplary damages, among others, to Miano. Issue: WON the award of moral & exemplary damages is proper. Held: No. Petitioner’s actuation was not attended by bad faith. In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The established facts evince that petitioner’s late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not motivated by ill will or bad faith. In fact, it immediately coordinated with its Central Baggage Services to trace private respondent’s suitcase and succeeded in finding it. The award of exemplary damages is also not proper. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner. Sulpicio Lines vs. CA Facts: Tito and his daughter Jennifer boarded a vessel owned by Sulpicio Lines in Manila, with them were several pieces of luggage. Despite the fact that Storm Signal No. 2 was announced (subsequently raised to No. 3), the vessel proceeded its transport to Tacloban. Subsequently, while traversing, the vessel capsized and Tito and Jennifer, along with other passengers were thrown in the sea. Tito survived, but Jennifer did not. Trial Court awarded actual, damages for death, moral and exemplary damages. Issue: WON the award of the damages is proper. Held: Actual – Not proper. There was no evidence showing the basis for the award. There is no showing that the value of the contents of the lost pieces of baggage was based on the bill of lading or was previously declared by Tito before he boarded the ship. Damages for Death – Proper. Deaths caused by a crime as quasi delict are entitled to actual and compensatory damages without the need of proof of the said damages. Moral Damages – Proper. in breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may be recovered when it results in the death of a passenger. Exemplary Damages – Proper. A common carrier is obliged to transport its passengers to their destinations with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.The trial court found that petitioner failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, which resulted in the sinking. Thus, the sinking of the vessel was due to gross negligence. Trans World Airlines (TWA) vs. CA Facts: Vinluan, a practicing lawyer in Manila had to travel to several cities in Europe and US. While in Paris, he went to the office of TWA to confirm his reservation for first class accommodation. It was confirmed twice. During the time of the flight, he was told that there was no 1st class seat available. Hence, he was downgraded to economy. He protested but he was arrogantly treated by a TWA employee. And while waiting for his flight, he saw white Caucasians who arrived much later than him, in first class seats. Issue: WON Vinluan is entitled to damages. Held: Yes. 1 The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was subjected is undeniable. Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the respondent court is in order. 2 Inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. Phil Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Esguerra Facts: Esguerra boarded abus owned by Phil Rabbit Bus Lines from Manila to Pampanga. While in Bulacan, the bus and a truck sideswiped each other. The left forearm of Esguerra was hit. The left arm was amputated. The trial court awarded Esguerra moral damages, among others. Issue: WON the award of moral damages is proper. Held: No. Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, as in the instant case. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not result. The Court of Appeals found that the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. In other words. both vehicles were in their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier’s driver. This being the case, no moral damages are recoverable. People of the Phil vs. More Facts: The More brothers were found guilty of murder for the killing of Valentino who sustained 18 stab wounds. They were ordered to pay by the trial court damages for funeral services and other expenses, loss of income for 5 years, and moral damages. Issue: WON the award of damages is proper. Held: The award of moral damages should be reduced. The award is not meant to enrich the heirs of the victim but only to compensate them for injuries sustained to their feelings. The award of actual damages must be reduced as well. Only the costs of the tomb, coffin, embalming and funeral services were properly receipted. Thus, the alleged expenses for food and drinks consumed during the wake must be disallowed for not having been competently proved. The Court can only give credit to expenses which have been duly substantiated. The award of lost earning capacity must be increased. The victim’s lost earnings are to be computed according to the formula adopted by the Court in several decided cases, to wit: net earning capacity (“X”) equals life expectancy multiplied by gross annual income less living expenses. There must also be an award for civil indemnity for death without need of evidence or proof of damages. United Airlines vs. CA Facts: Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned; they used the 1st coupon. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words “CHECK-IN REQUIRED,” for a United Airlines flight. However, the Fontanillas were not able to board said flight because allegedly, they did not have assigned seat numbers. Issue: Whether or not the Fontanillas were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith. Held: No. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to except that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to moral damages. However, the Court’s ruling in said case should be read in consonance with existing laws, particularly, Economic Regulations No. 7, as amended, of the Civil Aeronautics Board which provides that overbooking not exceeding 10% of the seating capacity of the aircraft shall not be considered as a deliberate and willful act of non-accommodation. ——————————————————————— What law is applicable, the Philippine Law or the US Law? he Philippine Law. The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were “rewritten” in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila. Sps Zalamea vs. CA & TWA Facts: Sps Zalamea and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from TWA from its Manila agent for a flight to New York to LA. Two tickets were purchased at a discounted rate of 75% while one was purchased in its full value. All three tickets were confirmed and reconfirmed. However, of the appointed date, they were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all of the seats. Those having full fare tickets were given priority among those in the wait-list. Thus, Cesar Zalamea was able to board such flight because he was holding the full fare ticket. Trial court awarded the Zalameas moral damages, among others, based on breach of contract of carriage. The CA, however, reversed this, holding that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines. Issue: Whether or not said policies (that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice in the US, thus does not amount to bad faith) were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners’ contracts of carriage. Held: No. TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages
Batch 2 Tabacalera Insurance vs. North Front Shipping Facts: Sacks of grains were loaded on board a vessel owned by North Front Shipping (common carrier); the consignee: Republic Floor Mills. The vessel was inspected by representatives of the shipper prior to the transport and was found fitting to carry the cargo; it was also issued a Permit to Sail. The goods were successfully delivered but it was not immediately unloaded by the consignee. There were a shortage of 23.666 metric tons and some of the merchandise was already moldy and deteriorating. Hence, the consignee rejected all the cargo and demanded payment of damages from the common carrier. Upon refusal, the insurance companies (petitioners) were obliged to pay. Petitioners now allege that there was negligence on the part of the carrier. The trial court ruled that only ordinary diligence was required since the charter-party agreement converted North Front Shipping into a private carrier. Issues: WON North Front Shipping is a common carrier. If indeed, did it fail to exercise the required diligence and thus should be held liable? Held: North Front Shipping is a common carrier. Thus, it has the burden of proving that it observed extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost cargo. The charter-party agreement between North Front Shipping Services, Inc., and Republic Flour Mills Corporation did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. A “charter-party” is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or usex x x Having been in the service since 1968, the master of the vessel would have known at the outset that corn grains that were farm wet and not properly dried would eventually deteriorate when stored in sealed and hot compartments as in hatches of a ship. Equipped with this knowledge, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid or lessen the cargo’s possible deterioration as they were presumed knowledgeable about the nature of such cargo. But none of such measures was taken. It did not even endeavor to establish that the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods was due to the following: (a) flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (b) act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (c) act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (d) the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (e) order or act of competent public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is rightly liable therefor. However, the destruction, loss or deterioration of the cargo cannot be attributed solely to the carrier. The consignee Republic Flour Mills Corporation is guilty of contributory negligence. It was seasonably notified of the arrival of the barge but did not immediately start the unloading operations. Philippine Home Assurance Corp (PHAC) vs. CA Facts: Eeastern Shipping Lines Inc. (ESLI) loaded on board a vessel (SS Easter Explorer) several shipment for carriage to several consignees. While the vessel was off Okinawa, Japan, a small fire was detected on the acetylene cylinder located in the accommodation area near the engine room. This resulted in a flash of flame throughout the accommodation area. The vessel was abandoned. All the cargoes of ESLI were delivered to their respective consignees but with corresponding additional freight and salvage charges. All the charges were paid by PHAC. Thus, PHAC now seeks recovery from ESLI alleging that they were negligent. ESLI argues, among others, that the fire was a fortuitous event. Issue: WON the fire was a fortuitous event. WON ESLI should be held liable for the additional charges. Held: No, the fire cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. Thus, it is presumed that ESLI was negligent and should be held liable to PHAC. In our jurisprudence, fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity since it almost always arises from some act of man or by human means. It cannot be an act of God unless caused by lightning or a natural disaster or casualty not attributable to human agency. There is strong evidence indicating that the acetylene cylinder caught fire because of the fault and negligence of respondent ESLI, its captain and its crew: (1) The acetylene cylinder which was fully loaded should not have been stored in the accommodation area near the engine room where the heat generated therefrom could cause the acetylene cylinder to explode by reason of spontaneous combustion; (2) Respondent ESLI should have known that by storing the acetylene cylinder in the accommodation area supposed to be reserved for passengers, it unnecessarily exposed its passengers to grave danger and injury. (3) The fact that the acetylene cylinder was checked, tested and examined and subsequently certified as having complied with the safety measures and standards by qualified experts before it was loaded in the vessel only shows to a great extent that negligence was present in the handling of the acetylene cylinder after it was loaded and while it was on board the ship. PAL vs. CA Facts: Spouses Miranda, residents of Surigao City, went to the US on a regular flight of PAL. On return to the Philippines, the spouses boarded a flight by PAL with 5 pieces of baggage. Upon arrival at Manila, they were told by a PAL personnel that their baggage were ofloaded at Honolulu due to weight limitations. Because of this, they missed their connecting flight to Cebu, as well as the subsequent connecting flight to Surigao. While in Cebu, their flight to Surigao was also cancelled due to mechanical problems. Moreover, the Mirandas were compelled to haggle for hotel accommodations. Allegedly, they incurred additional expenses, mental anguish, etc. Issue: WON PAL should be held liable to the Mirandas for an award of moral damages. Held: YES. The Court has time and again ruled, and it cannot be over-emphasized, that a contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty and any discourteous conduct on the part of a carriers employee toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is bad faith. While it may be true that there was no direct evidence on record of blatant rudeness on the part of PAL employees towards the Mirandas, the fact that private respondents were practically compelled to haggle for accommodations, a situation unbefitting persons of their stature, is rather demeaning and it partakes of discourtesy magnified by PALs condescending attitude. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the PAL employees herein concerned were definitely less than candid, to put it mildly, when they withheld information from private respondents that they could actually be accommodated in a hotel of their choice. It is now firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. What the law considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit. Such unprofessional and prescribed conduct is attributable to petitioner airline in the case at bar and the adverse doctrinal rule is accordingly applicable to it. Baliwag Transit vs. CA Facts: Leticia Garcia and her son boarded a bus owned by Baliwag bound for Cabanatuan City. While in Nueva Ecija, the passengers saw a cargo truck at the shoulder of the national highway, and a kerosene lamp appeared to serve as a warning light. But the driver of the bus was driving at fast speed, failed to notice the truck and the kerosene lamp, and when he was able to step on the break, it was too late. The bus rammed into the cargo truck causing the death of the bus driver and the helper of the cargo truck driver; and injuries to Leticia and her son and to some other passengers. Issue: WON Baliwag Transit should be held liable. Held: YES. As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver’s recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored. Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor. She could smell him as she was seated right behind the driver. Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-employee. All these prove the bus driver’s wanton disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which make Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code. Ludo & Luym Corp. vs. I.V. Binamira Facts: Delta Photo Supply Company of New York shipped on board the M/S “FERNSIDE” at New York, U.S.A., 6 cases of films and/or photographic supplies consigned to the order of I. V. Binamira. A Bill of Lading was issued where the carrier and the consignee have stipulated to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the goods before they are actually delivered. The films were discharged at the port of Cebu by the stevedoring company hired by petitioner as agent of the carrier. The cargo was received by the Visayan Cebu Terminal Company, Inc., the arrastre operator appointed by the Bureau of Customs. During the discharge, the cargo was inspected by both the stevedoring company and the arrastre operator, and the films were found to be in good condition. But after it was delivered to respondent after 3 days, the same was examined by a surveyor and found out that some films and supplies were missing. Issue: WON the carrier is responsible for the loss though the films were lost after the shipment was discharged from the ship and placed in the possession and custody of the customs arrastre. Held: NO. It is true that, as a rule, a common carrier is responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods it assumes to carry from one place to another unless the same is due to any to any of the causes mentioned in Article 1734 on the new Civil Code. But this shall only apply when the loss, destruction or deterioration takes place while the goods are in the possession of the carrier, and not after it has lost control of them. The parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have still to go through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actually turned over to the consignee. This is a situation where we may say that the carrier losses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for what may happen during the interregnum. And this is precisely what was done by the parties herein. In the bill of lading that was issued covering the shipment in question, both the carrier and the consignee have stipulated to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the goods before they are actually delivered. American President Lines vs. Klepper Facts: Klepper shipped his goods on board a lift van owned American Pres. Lines his at Yokohama, Japan. While the lift van was being unloaded, it fell on the pier and its contents spilled and scattered. Petitioner contends that its liability should not exceed $500.00 invoking in its favor the bill of lading. The CA, however, refused this ar gument and reasoned that the bill of lading was not signed nor agreed upon by the parties. Issue: WON the liability of the American Pres. Lines should not esceed %500.00. Held: YES. Article 1753 of the civil code provides that the la w of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss, destruction or deterioration. This means the law of the Philippines, or the Civil Code. Under Article 1766, “In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws,” and in the Civil Code there are provisions that govern said rights and obligations (Arts. 1736, 1737, 1738). Therefore, although Section 4 (5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500.00 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and inserted in the bill of lading, said section is merely suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code. In accepting the bill of lading, the shipper, consignee and owner of the goods agree to be bound by all its stipulations, exceptions and conditions, whether written, printed or stamped on the front or backx x x Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. Facts: Appelles Servando and Bico loaded on board respondent’s vessel certain cargoes to be transported from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. Said warehouse, however, was burned by a fire with unknown orgin destroying the cargoes. Before the fire, Bico was able to discharge some of her cargoes. Issue: WON the common carrier should be held responsible for the damage. Held: NO. 1. In the Bill of Lading, there was a stipulation wherein the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment. The inserted provision was not contrary to law, morals or public policy. ‘Such provision has been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation’. 2. The burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event. Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. 3. There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier, incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse. 4. Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same. Samar Mining Company (appellee )vs. Lloyd and C.F. Charp Company, Inc. (appellants) Facts: Samar Mining Corp made an importation of goods from Germany to Manila, and a transshipment of the same goods from Manila to Davao evidenced by a bill of lading issued to Samar Mining. Upon arrival of the vessel at the port of Manila the importation was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the warehouse of AMCYL, which acted as appellant’s substitute in storing the goods awaiting transshipment. The goods were never delivered, nor received, by the consignee at the port of destination – Davao. Issue: WON the appellants as carrier are responsible for non-delivery to the port of destination. Held: NO. Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. In this case, two undertakings appeared embodied and/or provided for in the Bill of Lading in question. The first is FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS from Bremen, Germany to Manila; the second, THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE SAME GOODS from Manila to Davao, with appellant acting as agent of the consignee. At the hiatus between these two undertakings of appellant which is the moment when the subject goods are discharged in Manila, its personality changes from that of carrier to that of agent of the consignee. Thus, the character of appellant’s possession also changes, from possession in its own name as carrier, into possession in the name of consignee as the latter’s agent. Such being the case, there was, in effect, actual delivery of the goods from appellant as carrier to the same appellant as agent of the consignee. Upon such delivery, the appellant, as erstwhile carrier, ceases to be responsible for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from that point onwards. This is the full import of Article 1736, as applied to the case. But even as agent of the consignee, the appellant cannot be made answerable for the value of the missing goods, It is true that the transshipment of the goods, which was the object of the agency, was not fully performed. However, appellant had commenced said performance, the completion of which was aborted by circumstances beyond its control. An agent who carries out the orders and instructions of the principal without being guilty of negligence, deceit or fraud, cannot be held responsible for the failure of the principal to accomplish the object of the agency. ————————————- “Transship” means: to transfer for further transportation from one ship or conveyance to another The rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Ganzon vs. CA Facts: Tumambing contracted the services of Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan to Manila on board its lighter. Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Niza, the captain of the lighter. The loading begun on the same day of the delivery. When about half of the scrap was loaded, the Mayor demanded from Tumambing P5,000.00; upon resistance, Tumambing was injured by a gunshot from the Mayor. After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron resumed. The Acting Mayor with three policemen, however, ordered Niza and his crew to drop the scrap iron to the water. He then issued a receipt stating the the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. Issue: WON the carrier should be held liable. Held: YES. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Besides, the intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron. |
Batch 1 PhilAm Gen vs. PKS Shipping Facts: Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00). DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company (Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank. Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused. Issue: (1) Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and (2) WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS Shipping is liable. Held: (1) PKS Shipping is a common carrier. PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier. (2) PKS Shipping is not liable. The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barge’s hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC, common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to any of the following causes, among others: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x Baritua vs. Mercader Facts: The late Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the buy and sell of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar, boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line bounded from Manila to N. Samar. However, while said bus was traversing the Beily Bridge in N. Samar, the bus fell into the river, as a result, D. Mercader died. Petitioner alleges, among others, that there is no statement in the complaint of Mercader that he was issued any passenger-freight ticket. Issue: WON a contract of carriage existed between petitioners and Mercader. Or, WON petitioners are liable for the death of Mercader. Held: A contract of carriage exists, thus, petitioners are liable. Petitioners failed to transport D. Mercader to his destination, because the bus fell into a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the fall, he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The Court agreed with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that fateful morning. It must be noted that a common carrier, by the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It is supposed to do so by using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In case of death or injuries to passengers, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. United Airlines, Inc vs. CA Facts: Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned; they used the 1st coupon. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words “CHECK-IN REQUIRED,” for United Airlines Flight No. 1108. However, the Fontanillas were not able to board said flight but instead were able to board United Airlines Flight No. 803. Issue: (1) Whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith; and (2) What law is applicable, the Philippine Law or the US Law? Held: (1) No. Aniceto Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words “Check-In Required.” Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat numbers? (2) The Philippine Law. The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were “rewritten” in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila. PhilAm vs. CA Facts: Coca-Cola Bottlers loaded on board MV Asilda, a vessel owned by respondent FELMAN, 7,500 cases of 1-litter Coca-Cola softdrinks bottle to be transported from Zamboanga City to Cebu City. The shipment was insured by petitioner PHILAMGEN. The vessel left Zamboanga in a fine weather but the same sank in the waters of Zamboanga del Norte. Coca-Cola Bottlers filed a claim for damages against FELMAN which it denied, thus, filed an insurance claim with PHILAMGEN. PHILAMGEN now seeks recourse against FELMAN. Issue: WON FELMAN is liable for loss of the cargo due to its failure to observe the extraordinary diligence required by Art. 1733, NCC. Held: YES. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, “(c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case …” In the event of loss of goods, common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently. FELMAN, the shipowner, was not able to rebut this presumption. The sinking of the vessel was due to its unseaworthiness even at the time of its departure from the port of Zamboanga. It was top-heavy as an excessive amount of cargo was loaded on deck. Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Facts: Herminio L. Nocum was a passenger in appellant’s Bus No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. The injuries suffered by Nocum were not due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers. Issue: WON the bus company was negligent, hence liable for the injuries suffered by Nocum. Held: No. The Bus Company has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, “according to the circumstances of the (each) case.” Article 1733 qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be “according to all the circumstances of each case.” In this case, the circumstance that must be considered in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its passengers is the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. (Hence, the bus company’s failure to confiscate the baggage cannot be considered as a negligent act, but in accord to the circumstance of the case.) N.B. Thus, in other jurisdictions, and squarely applicable in the instant case: There is need for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension that the passenger’s baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the common carrier’s employee to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes the cornerstone of the common carrier’s liability in cases similar to the present one. Elite Shirt Factory vs. Hon. Cornejo Facts: Elite Shirt Factory (shipper) delivered to Compania Maritima (common carrier) several cartons of merchandise for shipment to several consignees. While such cargo was stored in the bodega owned by Compania Maritima, a fire broke. Elite Shirt, allegedly damaged, filed with the City Court of Manila a complaint against Compania Maritima for reimbursement. The latter filed an answer impleading Phil. Steam Navigation as third party defendant, on the ground that the fire started from the section occupied by such. Judge Cornejo of the city court favoured shipper Elite for the recovery of damages from common carrier Compania Maritima, but thereafter denied the judgment of execution and set aside its previous decision; the ground: Judge had no jurisdiction, but rather the CFI within its exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Elite Shirt Factory contends that the liability of the carrier, Compañia Maritima, from the time the shipment was deposited in its warehouse, was no longer as a common carrier but as a depository, hence, it is the City Court which has jurisdiction. Issue: Does the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on a Court of First instance over admiralty and maritime cases include the suit where the shipper files a claim against the carrier, the goods having been landed, stored in its bodega but subsequently burned, no delivery having been made to the consignee as a result? Held: YES, the instant case is included in the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI. THE REASON: the warehouse in which the cargo was deposited at the time it was burned was owned by the carrier, Compañia Maritima, itself. The cargo was burned before Compania Maritima could deliver it to the consignees. When, as in this case, the proceeding in effect is one for a breach of a contract of shipment, the jurisdiction of the court of first instance under the specific provision of the Judiciary Act is undeniable. N.B. Hence, if the bodega was owned NOT by Compania Maritima, it is the City Court which will have jurisdiction and not the CFI. City court will have jurisdiction when: the common carrier is liable as DEPOSITORY; CFI will have jurisdiction when: the carrier is liable as a common carrier, as in the instant case. Medina vs. Cresencia Facts: A passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque smashed into a Meralco post resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers. Guillermo Cresencia is the registered owner of the jeepney as well as the registered operator. On the other hand, Rosario Avorque, after the jeepney having been repeatedly sold from one buyer after another, is its current absolute owner as well as the employer of driver Brigido. Issue: (1) Who should be held liable for the death of Medina – the registered owner or the absolute owner? (2) WON Rosario Avorque has a subsidiary liability under the RPC for damages arising from her driver’s criminal act. Held: (1) The registered owner. The requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee x x x As the sale of the jeepney was admittedly without the approval of the Public Service Commission, Guillermo Cresencia, who is the registered owner and operator thereof, continued to be liable to the Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation. (2) No, she has no subsidiary liability. Medina’s action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employer’s subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the carrier’s contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code). Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Facts: Jose Cangco was an employee of the Manila Railroad Co. As an employee of the company, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company’s train free of charge. One day, while Cangco stepped off the car, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His arm was badly crashed and lacerated. Issue: Whether the liability of Manila Railroad constitutes culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Held: The liability constitutes culpa contractual (Contract of Carriage). The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant’s servants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N.B. Contributory Negligence on the part of Cangco: None. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished: (read from full text) 1. culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract 2. those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. 3. the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it. On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master’s negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract. Test in determining Contributory Negligence of plaintiff: Thompson’s work on negligence—- The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.” PAL vs. CA Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson was a regular co-pilot of PAL. During one of his flights from Manila to Legazpi with Captain Delfin Bustamante, they made a crash landing at Daet where Samson suffered physical injuries in the head. Samson alleges that the accident was due to the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Bustamante who was suffering from a long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx but was also allowed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration to fly as a co-pilot; and that because of the tumor Bustamante has a slow reaction and poor judgment. Issue: WON PAL was negligent as a common carrier in allowing Bustamante to fly as a First Officer the day of the accident. Or, WON the same carrier is liable for the accident even if Bustamante was not sick. Held: YES and YES. For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First Officer on January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty of gross negligence and therefore should be made liable for the resulting accident. (Even) assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing the plane, the evidence shows that overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. And for the negligence of defendant’s employee, it is liable. At least, the law presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. As defined in Art. 1732, NCC, petitioner is a common carrier. The law is clear in requiring a common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business of carriage and transportation under Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756, NCC. The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane, passengers and crew members alike. Sarkies Tours Phil vs. IAC Facts: The Dizons purchased 6 round trip tickets from Sarkies for a tour to Corregidor form Manila, and back. They were given two tickets both with the name SARKIES appearing therein. The word “Edisco” was however handwritten on the white ticket. The white tickets were collected on board by Julian Mendoza, while the blue tickets were collected upon boarding the Sarkies bus. The MV Edisco owned and operated by Mendoza was not registered nor was it licensed to operate as a watercraft. On return to Manila, the weather was the same as when they left. After about thirty minutes of cruising, the boat leaned towards the starboard; the boat capsized. As a result, Merceditas, the daughter of the spouses Dizon, among others, died. The Dizons filed a complaint for damages against Sarkies. Sarkies, as an answer, included a cross-claim against Mendoza. Issue: WON, under the Civil Code, Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza. Held: Yes. Considering that actual negligence for the drowning of Merceditas was the responsibility of Mendoza, it is but fair that Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza for reimbursement. Although Article 2181 of the Civil Code is not technically invocable, its principle should be applied in favor of Sarkies. The provision of the Civil Code on common carriers is based on Anglo-American Law. In Grand Trunk R. Co. vs Latham, 63 Me. 177, the following was said: “Where a railroad company had been compelled to pay a judgment for damages for injuries sustained by a passenger as a result of the maltreatment and misconduct of the conductor…the Court (held) that the servant was liable to his master for all loss and damage sustained by it.” |
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Batch 3 Equitable Leasing vs. Suyom Facts: A Fuso Road tractor driven by Tutor rammed into the house cum of Tamayo which resulted in the death of Tamayo’s son and Oledan’s daughter. Failure to claim from a criminal case finding Tutor guilty of reckless imprudence, respondents filed a civil case based on quasi delict against Equitable Leasing Corp, the registered owner of the tractor, among others. Equitable contends that it should not be held liable for such damages which arose from the negligence of the driver Fuso Road. That such tractor was already sold to the owner of Fuso Road at the time of the accident. Thus, not having employed driver Tutor, it could not have controlled or supervised him. Issue: WON Equitable should be held liable for damages in an action based on quasi delict for the negligent acts of a driver who was not its employee. Held: Yes, Equitable should be held liable because it was the registered owner at the time of the accident. The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. BA Finance Corp vs. CA G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992 Facts: Amare, the driver of an Isuzu truck was involved in an accident which caused the death of three persons. Amare was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence. BA Finance was found liable for damages since the truck was registered in its name. BA Finance contends that it should not be held liable since it was not Amare’s employer at the time of the accident. It also contends that the Isuzu truck was in the possession of Rock Component Phil, by virtue of a lease agreement. Hence, BA Finance wants to prove who the actual/real owner is at the time of the accident, and in accordance with such proof, evade liability and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle. Issues: 1 WON BA Finance should be held liable. 2 WON BA Finance can escape liability by proving the actual/real owner of the truck. Held: 1 Yes, BA Finance is liable. The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person. Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or to the third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets. 2 No, the law does not allow him. The law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of registration. This may appear harsh but nevertheless, a registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. While the registered owner is primarily responsible for the damage caused, he has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused. Duavit vs. CA, Sarmiento & Catuar G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989 Facts: Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met an accident with another jeep driven by Sabiniano. This accident caused injuries to private respondents, thus they filed a case for damages against driver Salbiniano and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership of the jeep but contends that he should not be held liable since Salbiniano is not his employee and that the jeep was taken by Salbiniano without his (Duavit) consent. Issue: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable as an employer when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with his consent. Held: No, an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. To hold the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. Lim & Gunnaban vs. CA & Gonzales Facts: Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Vallarta. Vallarta remained as the holder of a certificate of public convenience and the registered owner of the jeepney. Subsequently, the jeepney collided with a ten-wheeler truck owned by Lim, driven by Gunnaban which resulted in the death of 1 passenger and injuries to all others. Failure to arrive to a settlement with Lim for the repair of the jeepney, Gonzales brought an action for damages against Lim & Gunnaban. Lim denied liability asserting that Vallarte, and not Gonzales, is the real party in interest being the registered owner of the jeepney. He further asserts that an operator of the vehicle continues to be its operator as he remains the operator of record; and that to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for damages is utterly subversive of public policy. Issue: WON Gonzales, an operator under the kabit system (considering that he is not the registered owner of the jeepney), may sue for damages against Lim. Or, WON Gonzales is a real party in interest. Held: Yes, Gonzales may sue. The evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system* does not exist. 1 Neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. 2 The case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in stoppels for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner. 3 The riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right. Thus, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N.B. The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, thekabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved. Baliwag Transit Incs (BTI) vs CA & Martinez G.R. No. L-57493 January 7, 1987 Facts: Martinez, claiming to be an employee of two bus lines operating under different grants of franchise but were issued only one ID Number: “Baliwag Transit” owned and operated by the late Tuazon and “Baliwag Transit Inc” (BTI) owned by de Tengco, (Martinez) filed a petition with the Social Security Commission to compel BTI to remit his premium contributions to SSS. BTI denied ever employing Martinez, and alleges that he was in fact employed by Tuason who operated a separate and distinct bus line from BTI. The Social Security Commission granted Martinez’s petition. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the commission, finding that Tuason was operating under the kabit system; that while Tuason was the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission in his own name; and thus ordered BTI to remit Martinez’ premiums to SSS. Issue: WON the issuance by SSS of one ID Number to the two bus lines necessarily indicates that one of them is operating under the kabit system. Held: No. The “Kabit System” has been defined by the Supreme Court as an arrangement “whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee.” The determining factor, therefore, is the possession of a franchise to operate which negates the existence of the “Kabit System” and not the issuance of one SSS ID Number for both bus lines from which the existence of said system was inferred. Thus, it is evident that both bus lines operated under their own franchises but opted to retain the firm name “Baliwag Transit” with slight modification, by the inclusion of the word “Inc.” in the case of herein petitioner, obviously to take advantage of the goodwill such firm name enjoys with the riding public. Conversely, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the late Pascual Tuazon, during the time material to this case operated his buses under the “Kabit System” on the ground that while he was actually the owner and operator, his buses were not registered with the Public Service Commission (now the Bureau of Land Transportation) in his own name, is not supported by the records. Philtranco & Manilhig vs. CA & Heirs of Acuesta G.R. No. 120553 June 17, 1997 Facts: Acuesta was riding his easy rider bicycle. One of the buses of Philtranco driven by Manilhig, on the other hand, was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. Subsequently, the engine started which occurred at the time when Acuesta was directly in front of the bus. Acuesta was run over by the bus. Trial court rendered a decision ordering Philtranco & Manilhig to be jointly and severally liable to the Heirs of Acuesta. CA affirmed, holding that Philtranco has a solidary liability with Manilhig under Art 2194 of the Civil Code. Issue: WON Philtranco’s liability is solidary (jointly & severally) with Manilhig. Or, WON Art 2194 is applicable. Held: Yes. It had been consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several orsolidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employer’s liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. Tamayo vs. Aquino et al & Rayos G.R. Nos. L-12634 and L-12720 May 29, 1959 Facts: Epifania Gonzales (wife of Aquino) boarded a truck owned by Tamayo, holder of a certificate of public convenience to operate. Allegedly, while Epifania was making a trip aboard the truck, it bumped against a culvert on the side of the road, causing her death. Aquino et al filed an action for damages against Tamayo. Tamayo answered alleging that the truck is owned by Rayos, so he filed a 3rd party complaint against him (Rayos). The CFI ruled that Tamayo is the registered owner, under a public convenience certificate but such truck was sold to Rayos one month after the accident, but he (Tamayo) did not inform the Public Service Commission of the sale. CFI held Tamayo and Rayos jointly and severally liable to Aquino. CA affirmed, holding that, both the registered owner (Tamayo) and the actual owner and operator (Rayos) should be considered as joint tortfeasors and should be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code (solidary). Issue: WON Art 2194 (solidary liability) is applicable; and, if NOT, how should Tamayo (holder of the cert. of public convenience) participate with Rayos (transferee/operator) in the damages recoverable. Held: No, Art 2194 is not applicable. The action instituted in this case is one for breach of contract, for failure of the defendant to carry safety the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e., for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict. As the registered owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict; their responsibility is NOT SOLIDARY. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured. But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered   
TRANSPO NOTES 1. TRANSPORTATION - (etymology) movement of things or persons from one place to another; a carrying across; and it is immaterial whether the carrying be by rail, by water, or by air. 2. COMMON CARRIER - (1732, NCC) persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or, air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. 3. CULPA AQUILIANA - (2176, NCC) Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict… 4. CULPA CRIMINAL - (Criminal Negligence-365,RPC) wrongful act resulting from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 5. SHIPPER - consignor, exporter, or seller (who may be the same or different parties) named in the shipping documents as the party responsible for initiating a shipment and who may also bear the freight cost. 6. CONSIGNEE - person or firm (usually a buyer) named by the consignor (seller) in the transportation of documents as the party to whose order a consignment will be delivered at a port of destination. 7. Negotiorum Gestio - one of the principal kinds of quasi-contracts… It arises whenever a person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another without any power or authority from the latter. 8. Mora - default/delay; non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time. Kinds: a. Mora Solvendi - delay of the debtor to perform his obligation. b. Mora accipiendi (acceptance) - delay of the creditor to accept the delivery of the thing which is the object of the obligation (without justifiable cause). 9. Culpa Contractual (1170-1174, NCC) - Breach of Contract; fault/negligence of a person whose failure to observe the required diligence to the obligation causes damage to another |
